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VICIOUS CIRCLES IN THE LOUISIANA
LAW OF PRIVILEGES
Joseph Dainow*
I.
Privileges or preferences among creditors constitute a kind
of security device because the privileged or preferred' creditors
are not subjected to the general rule of proration but are paid
in full before ordinary creditors get anything.' When two or
more privileged creditors are in competition, the Civil Code
stipulates that there is also a ranking or priority among them ;2
they do not rank concurrently except when the competing privi-
leges are of the same nature or when concurrence is expressly
provided.3 The subject matter of privileges is stricti juris, and
therefore there must be a written text of law to support the
creation and existence of each privilege, 4 and there must also
be an express text as authority for each ranking question as
between privileges. 5 Furthermore, by reason of the stricti juris
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. With acknowledgment to my
students (Summer Session, 1964) for their critiques and cooperation.
1. LA. CivL CODE art. 3183 (1870) : "The property of the debtor is the com-
mon pledge of his creditors, and the proceeds of its sale must be distributed
among them ratably, unless there exist among the creditors some lawful causes
of preference."
Id. art. 3184: "Lawful causes of preference are privilege and mortgages."
In Louisiana law and usage, the words "privilege" and "lien" are often used
interchangeably.
2. Id. art. 3187: "Among creditors who are privileged, the preference is set-
tled by the different nature of their privileges."
3. Id. art. 3188: "The creditors who are in the same rank of privileges, are
paid in concurrence, that is on an equal footing." See also LA. R.S. 9:4809;
9:4521(1) ; 9:4521(4) (1950).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3185 (1870) : "Privilege can be claimed only for those
debts to which it is expressly granted in this Code." There must, of course, be
understood the addition "and by statute." See LA. R.S. 9:4501-4503 (1950).
"No consideration of equity can enter into the determination of the right of
privilege." Boylan's Detective Agency v. Arthur Brown & Co., 157 La. 325, 102
So. 417 (1924). See also State ex rel. Metropolitan Land Co. v. Recorder of
Mortgages, 166 La. 271, 117 So. 145 (1928); In re Employer's Liab. Assur.
Corp., 180 La. 406, 156 So. 447 (1934) ; Boone v. Brown, 201 La. 917, 10 So. 2d
701 (1942) ; City of Alexandria v. Shevnin, 240 La. 983, 126 So. 2d 336 (1961).
5. E.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3191, 3251, 3254-3270 (1870). No distinction
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nature of the subject, it is not appropriate in this discussion" to
reopen any of the policy considerations which went into the
creation of the privilege or into the rules of ranking among
privileges. 7
However, for our frustration, the lawmakers have never
tried to envisage the whole picture of rankings, so that there
is an accumulation of piecemeal or partial sets of rules which
do not constitute a coherent framework. Any effort to formu-
late a single, comprehensive order of ranking among existing
privileges must fail because this is impossible. Furthermore, as
a result of the separate, legal texts concerning the rankings
among separate pairs or groups of privileges, there have de-
veloped the so-called "vicious circles," where privilege A primes
privilege B, privilege B primes privilege C, and privilege C
primes privilege A.
The general attitude in the legal profession has seemed to
be that there is no way out of these vicious circles and that the
important thing is to be able to identify such situations in order
to know when to litigate and when to compromise (pro rata).
Such a compromise does not resolve the legal issues involved,
and it may be questioned whether this estimate of the situation
is correct; there is reaction against the idea of a legal problem
which defies solution.8 There is need for legislative clarifica-
tion of rules and policies, but a realistic appraisal of such a
possibility is not an optimistic one. The present article is an
inquiry into this problem, and contains some proposed solutions
in accordance with existing law.
II.
It is customary to start work on a problem by examining the
existing general rules and principles and the jurisprudence (de-
cided cases). As to the latter, a search has not uncovered any
is drawn between the code or statutory formulas: ". . . primes all other privi-
leges except . . .", "... yields only to . . .", "paid in preference to all other
debts except . . .", and so forth.
• Analogy, syllogism, and even the argument a fortiori are absolutely excluded
and inapplicable. See Succession of Hardy, 11 La. App. 239, 122 So. 154, (1st
Cir. 1929).
6. With the exception of the case described in the text accompanying note
46 infra.
7. E.g., Fisk v. Moores, 11 Rob. 279 (La. 1845).
8. Of. GltNY, MIITHODE D'INTERFPRTATION ET SOURCES EN DRorr PRrvik PoSI-
Ir (An English translation by La. State Law Institute) 454-57, 460, 564, §1 185,
187, 223 (1963).
[Vol. XXV
LOUISIANA LAW OF PRIVILEGES
judicial decision in Louisiana which has dealt squarely with. the
disentanglement of a vicious circle in the ranking of privileges.
The probability of such occurrence is not high, since attorneys
would recommend compromise; usually, the sums involved would
not be substantial enough to support expensive litigation. Con-
sequently, there is no help from that source.
As to the general rules and principles, there is some guid-
ance and a means of conflict-avoidance, in the Civil Code ex-
press ranking provisions for all the general privileges9 and in
the rule that the general privileges which affect both movables
and immovables should first be paid from available movables.10
The Civil Code also contains some express provisions for
resolving conflicts between special privileges.'" Another rule is
that, unless the specific conflict is expressly provided for,12
special privileges come ahead of the general privileges.13
There is also the rule of statutory construction specialia
generalibus derogant, which reconciles a conflict by giving ef-
fect to the special law (regardless of enactment date) as an
exception to the general law,'1 4 and this also applies to the rank-
ing of privileges.' 5
In addition, a most helpful rule for the ranking of privileges
is the settled rule of statutory construction that, in,the event
of irreconcilable1 6 conflict between two legislative texts, the
9. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3191, 3252 (1870).
10. Id. arts. 3253, 3266, 3269.
11. Id. arts. 3255-3269.
12. E.g., the special privilege of the lessor is primed by the general privileges
for law costs (id. art. 3256) and funeral expenses (id. art. 3257).
13. Id. arts. 3254, 3255, 3269, 3270. See also Dainow, Article 3267 and tho
Ranking of Privileges, 9 LA. L. REV. 370 (1949).
14. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5024 (3d .ed'
1943 by Horack, and 1964 supp. by Sands) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND] ;
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 167 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
CRAWF@RD] ; Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 43, 62 So. 2d 92, 95 (1952), aind
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term - Legisla-
tion, 14 LA. L. REV. 92-94 (1953) ; Hewitt v. Webster, 118 So. 2d 688 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960) ; Lelong v. Sutherland, 134 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ;
State v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Board, 135 So. 2d 665 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1961).
15. Laporte v. Libby, 114 La. 570, 38 So. 457 (1905). The priority over the
lessor which LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3259 (par. 2) (1870) gives to the unpaid
vendor of "farming utensils" is treated as a special rule by way of exception to
the general rule in id. art. 3263, which gives the lessor preference over the vendor.
In this way, both provisions are given effect. .
16. First, it is fundamental that every effort should be made to reconcile and
harmonize different enactments so as to give effect to all legislation; however,
this is not always possible, and consequently there is need for a rule to deal With
the irreconcilable conflict. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 17, 23 (1870) ; SUTHE.RLANA
1964]
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later expression prevails over the earlier one. 17
In the Civil Code and in the statutes, there are a great many
texts which fix the rankings of privileges, and there is no need
to linger over these. In the absence of express provision, the
conflict between any two competing privileges can be resolved
by one or a combination of these rules or guiding principles.
When three or more competing privileges come together in
certain combinations, the applicable ranking provisions some-
times create a "vicious circle."' 8 It is now our purpose to exam-
ine some specific instances of such vicious circles, and to pro-
pose a basis for their resolution.
III.
Vicious circles involve the conflicting sources of law in vari-
ous combinations: Civil Code versus chattel mortgage law; Civil
Code versus other statutes; conflicts within the Civil Code; con-
flicts between statutes (other than the Civil Code) ; combina-
tions of any of these. Under the Civil Code and in some stat-
utes, ranking is based on the nature of the privileges ;19 the
chattel mortgage law establishes a chronological basis for rank-
ing;20 some statutes use both criteria.21 The following are some
illustrative vicious circles.
§ 3711; CRAWFORD § 325; Lewis Hardware Co v. Gremillion, 65 So. 2d 807 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1953).
17. See SUTIERLAND §§ 2003, 2012, 2014, 2016; CRAWFORD §§ 137, 160, 166;
State v. Board of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee Dist., 188 La. 1, 175 So. 678 (1937) ;
Fullilove v. United States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 129 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961).
See also (even as to inadvertent changes) City of Alexandria v. LeCombe,
220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206 (1952) ; New Orleans Opera Guild, Inc. v. Local 174,
Musicians Mutual Protective Union, 242 La. 134, 150, 134 So. 2d 901, 907 (1961).
. The rule of later legislation is often based on the concept of an implied repeal
of the earlier enactment with which it conflicts. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 22, 23
(1870). Whereas an express repeal removes the earlier law from the books, so
to speak, an implied repeal has a more flexible scope of operation. The implied
repeal may range from the same total effect as an express repeal to the much
lesser effect of repealing only those parts with which there is irreconcilable con-
flict, or the still lesser effect of merely superseding the earlier legislation in those
situations where it is in irreconcilable conflict with the later legislation while
leaving the earlier enactment fully effective and operative for all situations which
do not at the same time involve the more recent law. In this case, where the
later legislation prevails only pro hoc vice, it may be too strong a statement to
say that the earlier law is "repealed." See Gorham v. Mathieson Alkali Works,
Inc., 210 La. 462, 27 So. 2d 299 (1946).
18. In common law jurisdictions, the phrase "circuity of liens" is less emotive
but more descriptive.
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3187 (1870).
20. LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950) (as last amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 481,
51) ; and LA. R.S. 32:710B (1950).
21. E.g., LA. R.S. 9:4501, 9:4502 (1950).
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A. Civil Code versus Chattel Mortgage Law.
A classical instance of a vicious circle is the case of a per-
son who purchases an item on credit, and then has a duly-
recorded chattel mortgage placed on it before he brings it onto
his leased premises. The vendor's privilege primes the chattel
mortgage, and the chattel mortgage primes the lessor's privi-
lege, but the lessor primes the vendor. Each element of this
vicious circle is based on an express text of law, so that policy
arguments are inappropriate, and in any event they would
merely rephrase the same vicious circle in different words. The
supporting legal texts are the chattel mortgage act, R.S. 9:5354
(chattel mortgage primes all privileges "arising subsequently
thereto") ,22 and Civil Code article 3263 (lessor primes ven-
dor) .28 However, the authority of these legislative sources is
not the same because the chattel mortgage act is the later of
the two. According to its ranking provision, the chattel mort-
gage yields to a prior vendor's privilege but primes a subse-
quent lessor's privilege. Thus, the application of the chattel
mortgage statute to the facts of the illustrative case results in
the following order of ranking: (1) vendor's privilege, (2)
chattel mortgage, (3) lessor's privilege.
The Civil Code provision places the lessor ahead of the ven-
dor, and this is of course still good law when these two alone
are in competition; but when there is also a chattel mortgage
subsequent to the vendor's privilege and prior to the lessor's,
it requires the application of the chattel mortgage statute, and
this later legislation prevails as the authority for the ranking.
This statute establishes a chronological basis for the competi-
tion of other privileges with the chattel mortgage, 24 as dis-
tinguished from the Civil Code ranking on the basis of the na-
ture of the privileged debt regardless of the chronological order
of dates of creation. If the vendor's and lessor's privileges both
arose prior to or subsequent to the chattel mortgage, there
22. Id. 9:5354 (as last amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 481, § 1) : "Every
such mortgage shall be effective as against third persons from the time of filing
in the proper offices, and the filing shall be notice to all parties of the existence
of the mortgage, which shall be superior in rank to any privilege or preference
arising subsequently thereto. .. ."
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3263 (1870) : "The privilege of the vendor on mov-
ables sold by him, which are still in the possession of the vendee, yields to that
of the owner of the house or farm which they serve to furnish or supply, for
his rents. It yields also to the charges for affixing seals and making inventories,
but not to the funeral or other expenses of the debtor."
24. See Dainow, Ranking Problems of Chattel Mortgages and Civil Code Privi-.
leges in Louisiana Law, 13 LA. L. REV. 537,,542 (1953).
1964]
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would be no conflict between the code article and the chattel
mortgage law, so that full effect could be given to both ranking
provisions.
B. Civil Code versus Statute
Another kind of statutory interference with the code system
of ranking privileges is found in the garageman's lien statute.25
According to this statute, the unpaid mechanic (within ninety
days of the repair job) has a privilege which yields to the ven-
dor's privilege, but not to the lessor. As the Civil Code places
the lessor ahead of the vendor, the following vicious circle is
presented: the vendor primes the mechanic, who primes the
lessor; and the lessor in turn primes the vendor.26 Since the
statute is the later legislation, the application of its rules to our
problem results in the following ranking: (1) vendor's privi-
lege; (2) mechanic's privilege; (3) lessor's privilege.
C. Amended versus Unamended Civil Code Articles
1. The competition between a conventional mortgage,2 7 a
widow's homestead privilege, and a privilege for funeral charges
involves a conflict between the ranking provisions of article
3252 (widow yields to mortgage but not to funeral charges) and
article 3186 (privilege for funeral charges primes conventional
mortgage28), and presents this vicious circle: mortgage primes
widow primes funeral charges primes mortgage. However, ar-
ticle 3252 was amended in 1918 so that its text is of later legis-
lative vintage than the 1870 text of article 3186. This later
legislation of the amended article 3252 produces the following
result as to ranking: (1) conventional mortgage, (2) widow's
homestead, (3) funeral charges.
2. If, in competition with a widow's homestead privilege,
there is a vendor and a lessor, this presents another vicious cir-
25. LA. R.S. 9:4501 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1:
. This privilege has no effect against a vendor's privilege, a chattel mortgage
previously recorded, or against a bona fide purchaser to whom possession has
been delivered and who has paid the purchase price without previous notice of
the existence of the privilege."
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3263 (1870).
27. Although mortgage is a preference, it is not technically a privilege, but
this case is included, in connection with the case which follows, to show the im-
possibility of splitting up article 3252 on the basis of the part (re mortgage)
which was added in 1918.
28. Alter v. O'Brien, 31 La. Ann. 452 (1879) ; Succession of Hardy, 11 La.
App. 239, 122 So., 154 (lst Cir. 1929) ; Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Succession
of Brooks, 180 So. 170 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
[Vol. XXV
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cle in that the vendor primes the widow, 29 who primes the les-
sor,3 who in turn primes the vendor.81 The widow's homestead
is dealt with in Civil Code articles 3252 and 3254, but article
3252 is to be used because its 1918 amendment gives it a later
date of enactment than the 1870 text of article 3254. Further-
more, the 1918 amendment of article 325282 prevails over the
unamended ranking provision of article 3263, by which lessor
primes vendor, so that the ranking solution is: (1) vendor, (2)
widow's homestead, (3) lessor.
3. Another vicious circle of this kind is presented by the
competition between the privilege of a depositor, which takes
preference over the privilege for funeral expenses,33 which
primes the lessor 3 4 who has a preference over the depositor (if
other movables are insufficient and lessor had no knowledge that
things did not belong to his tenant).35 Of the three texts in-
volved, article 3260, being amended in 1871, is the latest expres-
sion of the legislature and produces the following result: (1)
lessor, (2) depositor, (3) funeral expenses.
29. LA. CWvMi CODE art. 3252 (1870) W"... henever the widow or minor
children of a deceased person shall be left in necessitous circumstances, and not
possess in their own rights property to the amount of One Thousand Dollars, the
widow or the legal representatives of the children, shall be entitled to demand
and receive from the succession of the deceased husband or father, a sum which
added to the amount of property owned by them, or either of them, in their own
right, will make up the sum of one thousand dollars, and which amount shall be
paid in preference to all other debts, except those secured by the vendor's privi-
lege on both movables and immovables, conventional mortgages, and expenses
incurred in selling the property.
30. Ibid.
31. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 3263 (1870).
32. Even though the 1918 amendment made no change in those parts of the
text which concern the parties here involved, this date of enactment applies to
the entire text of the article, which, as a whole, was amended and reenacted at
that time. See note 27 supra.
33. LA. CiviL CODE art. 3261 (1870) : "With the exception stated in the fore-
going article, the privilege of the depositor on the thing deposited is not preceded
by any other privileged debt, even funeral expenses, unless it be that the de-
positor must contribute to the expense of sealing and making inventory, because
this expense is necessary to the preservation of the deposit."
34. Id. art. 3257: "The case is the same with respect to the funeral expenses
of the debtor and his family; when there is no other source from which they.can
be-paid, they have a preference over the debt for rent or hire, on the price of the
movables contained in the house or on the farm."
35. Id. art. 3260, as amended by La. Acts 1871, No. 87: "If, among the
movables with which the house or farm, or any other thing subject to the lessor's
privilege, is provided, there should be some which were deposited by a third per-
son in the hands of the lessor [lessee]or farmer, the lessor shall have a preference
over the depositary [depositor] on the things deposited for the payment of his
rent, if there are no other movables subject to his privilege, or if they are not
sufficient; unless it be proved that the lessor knew that the things deposited did
.not belong to his tenant or farmer."
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D. Amended versus Unamended Civil Code Articles versus
Statute
Now, if the two preceding situations in B and C2 are com-
bined, there is the additional problem that, as between the me-
chanic and the widow, the code article favors the widow,86 while
the statute gives priority to the mechanic.8 7 Although article
3252 was amended in 1918, the mechanic's lien statute was
passed in 1926 (and reenacted in R.S. 1950, 9:4501), and as the
later legislation its ranking provision must prevail.
Thus, combining the results of these several conclusions, the
four privileges in these vicious circles should be placed in one
ranking in the following order: (1) vendor's privilege, (2) me-
chanic's privilege, (3) widow's homestead privilege, (4) lessor's
privilege.
E. Unamended Articles of Civil Code inter se
A very rare conflict arises from exclusively code ranking
provisions with the same chronological date marks of 1870 and
1825, with no intervening amendments. Thus, under Civil Code
article 3257, funeral charges prime the lessor, while, under ar-
ticle 3263, the vendor yields to the lessor but primes the funeral
charges. These are express code solutions for specific privilege
rankings, and it must be taken that the redactors of the 1825
Code did not intend to establish a vicious circle in these two
simultaneous legislative expressions within the same group of
code articles. In conjunction with the rule that special privi-
leges come ahead of general privileges, it must have been their
intention to establish the exception that in the presence of the
general privilege for funeral charges, the special privilege of the
lessor is expressly subordinated, whereas the rule is not dis-
turbed for the vendor. Accordingly, the ranking result would
be: (1) vendor, (2) funeral charges, (3) lessor.38
36. Id. art. 3252.
37. LA. R.S. 9:4501 (1950), as last amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1.
38. The lessor used to have one of the most favored privileges, but times have
changed. In more recent years, several statutes and one Civil Code amendment
have established certain privileges with ranking provisions which make these
privileges yield to the vendor's privilege while they prime the lessor's privilege.
See LA. R.S. 3:207 (1950) (agricultural credit corporation) ; tid. 9:4501 (ga-
rageman) ; id. 9:4502 (repairman); id. 9:4862 (oil well equipment) ; LA. CIvIL
CODE art. 3252 (widow's homestead) (1870). Statutory privileges on immov-
ables, likewise yielding to a vendor's privilege, include LA. R.S. 9:4801, 9:4812
(private building contract privileges) (1950) ; and id. 12:756 (loans by receiver
of*a corporation). Does this disclose :a repeated and consistent legislative policy
which is reversing the position of the vendor's and lessor's privileges :when in
[Vol. XXV
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IV.
There are also a number of problems of a more general na-
ture, which are not covered in the preceding discussion and
which might involve conflicting ranking provisions.
A. Civil Code Provisions Prior to R.C.C. 1870
In connection with the possibility of a conflict between two
ranking provisions of the Civil Code of 1870 which cannot be
resolved or reconciled under any of the techniques already out-
lined, it would be proper to go behind the common 1870 date of
promulgation. The Civil Code is not an ordinary statute, and
in the event of discrepancies between the prior English and
French versions of the same article, it has become accepted in
Louisiana that the formerly (Civil Code of 1825) official French
text of a code article prevails over the corresponding English
version.80 This is based upon the acceptance of the Civil Code
as a continuing institution; and when there has been no change
in the English text, it is proper to resolve the conflict now in
the same way that it would have been treated if it had arisen
prior to 1870.40 Therefore, on the basis of the same reasoning,
where one of the irreconcilable code provisions involved in a
vicious circle comes from a source which prior to 1870 had a
later promulgation date than the other provision in question,
the rule of the more recent legislative expression should pre-
vail.4
1
B. Statutory Provisions Prior to R.S. 1950
A similar kind of problem may involve two different pro-
visions of the Revised Statutes of 1950. The 1950 revision was
not supposed to make any change in the law, and therefore the
logical solution after 1950 would be that an irreconcilable con-
flict between different statutory provisions should be decided
in the same manner as it would have been resolved prior to
their unchanged incorporation into the 1950 revision, with con-
trolling effect in what had previously been the later legislation.
This position is supported by R.S. 1:16, which provides that
competition with these other privileges while not disturbing the ranking of the
vendor and lessor by themselves?
39. See:Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, in CIVIL CODE or LOUISIANA xxv
(Dainow ed. 1961), and cases cited at xli-xlii.
40. See Dainow, id. at xxvi.
41. See Gee v. Thompson, 11 La. Ann. 657 (1856) ; Lewis Hardware Co. v.
Gremillion, 65 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1953).
1964]
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"The Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 shall be construed as
continuations of and as substitutes for the laws or parts of
laws which are revised and consolidated herein," and protected
by R.S. 1:12, which expressly precludes any presumption of
legislative construction from the arrangement or classification
of the compilation.
As a matter of both law and policy, courts always seek a
basis of conciliation between any two statutes which disclose a
possibility of conflict.42 When the two provisions in question
are parts of one simultaneous enactment, no pebble is left un-
turned in this search for any possible conciliation so as to give
effect to both.43 Nevertheless, seldom as it might happen, there
may well be the situation of two provisions which are irrecon-
cilable. 44 It is for two such irreconcilable provisions (in one
simultaneous enactment) that the solution based on their pre-
vious chronological relationship is proposed.
45
C. Perfectly Equal Legislative Expressions
There still remains the possibility of a vicious circle which
is based on perfectly equal legislative expressions and which
42. Cf. SUTHERLAND § 3711; CRAWFORD § 325.
43. See Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 43, 62 So. 2d 92, 95 (1952) ; State
ex rel. Fudickar v. Heard, 223 La. 127, 134-35, 65 So. 2d 112, 114-15 (1953)';
Collector v. Olvey, 238 La. 980, 994, 117 So. 2d 563, 567 (1959). See also Note,
15 LA. L. REV. 472 (1955).
44. LA. R.S. 9:4501 (1950) creates in favor of a garageman a privilege which
is effective for a period of ninety days. If this privilege was on an automobile
for motor repairs, the same car could within the same period become subject to
another privilege under id. 9:4502 in favor of a person who replaced all of the
upholstery. Both statutes have exactly the same ranking provision, yielding only
to a vendor's privilege and a prior-recorded chattel mortgage and a bona fide
purchaser (with certain provisos), but there is no yielding by either one to the
other. (The savings clause in § 2 of Act 341 of 1946 (§ 1 of which is La. R.S.
9:4502) to preclude implied repeal of Act 209 of 1926 (La. R.S. 9:4501) does
not concern the ranking question.)
Both of these statutory provisions were last amended by the same Act 31 of
1960, and in the event of a conflict between the two, there appears to be no
basis for reconciliation. However, La. R.S. 9:4502 had been previously amended
by Act 427 of 1952, whereas La. R.S. 9:4501 has only its 1950 enactment date.
Accordingly, in the case of an irreconcilable conflict, La. R.S. 9:4502 would
prevail.
If there had been no amendments to either of these two statutes since their
original enactment, they would have equal legislative status within the Revised
Statutes of 1950, but La. R.S. 9:4502 would prevail as having been the later
legislation in Act 341 of 1946, whereas La. R.S. 9:4501 came into being as Act
209 of 1926.
45. See Lewis Hardware Co.'v. Gremillion, 65 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1953). Cf. Guillot v. Nunez, 225 La. 301, 72 So. 2d 513 (1954) ; Gabriel v.
United Theatres, Inc., 221 La. 219, 59 So. 2d 127 (1952), and critical comments
in The JWork of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1962-1968 Term - Civit
Procedure, 13 LA. L. REV. 306, at 324 (1953).
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does not yield to any of the rules or techniques already men-
tioned. In such a case, the first reaction is to compromise the
impasse by a pro rata distribution.' However, by virtue of Civil
Code article 21,46 it may be in order to reexamine the policy
considerations underlying each of the ranking provisions in-
volved and to make a decision by treating the matter as one for
which "there is no express law." Where two texts of exactly
equal dignity are thus in irreconcilable conflict, there is an "un-
provided for" case, 47 because this kind of an overlap of two con-
flicting rules is not dissimilar to a gap in the law for which
courts must fill in the answer- until the legislature speaks
again. According to this analysis, the solution could be an out-
right ranking among the competing privileges, as well as the
more likely pro rata distribution.
V.
It is not feasible, and it would not be useful, to attempt a
complete listing of all the actual possibilities of vicious circles
in the Louisiana law of privileges. A sufficient number in dif-
ferent categories have been described and resolved to identify
the problem and to demonstrate the proposed solution. There
is much to be said in favor of the equitable pro rata compromise
as a means of avoiding the legal issues, but it does not solve
them. The foregoing discussion and analysis meet the problem
squarely and propose solutions, utilizing well-established rules
and legal principles, especially the rule of statutory construction
that later legislation supersedes earlier enactments emanating
from the same authoritative source of law; and the solutions
proposed appear to be in accordance with law.
The law-making functions in our system of government are
performed by the legislature and the courts. Each has its own
area of operation, its own procedure, its own scope, and its own
responsibility. The legislature chooses the subjects for which it
makes laws, and the legislature also determines how far it goes
in providing these laws. The courts do not normally contribute
to the formulation of disputes which go into litigation, but they
46. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870) : "In all civil matters, where there is no
express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To
decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received
usages, where positive law is silent." (Emphasis added.)
47. See Dainow, Method of Legal Development through Judicial Interpreta-
tion in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, 22 REWSTA JuRIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE
PuEaTO Rico 108 (1953).
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do have the responsibility of adjudication. Where legislation
provides the direct answers or the bases on which solutions can
be founded, that is fine. However, where the legislation does
not give an answer or the basis for an answer (gap in the law),
or where the legislative provisions are in irreconcilable conflict
(inconsistent or conflicting overlap), the court must still make
a decision - vicious circles included.
